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Drazen’s paper represents a first effort to formalize the role of political 
considerations in the process of how currency crises are transmitted across 
international borders. The theoretical literature on “contagion” is scarce, 
and the empirical literature equally so. Yet the EMS currency crises of 
1992-93, the aftermath of the Mexican peso crisis of late 1994, and the 
meltdown of several Asian currencies in 1997 all have a flavor of “contagious 
currency crises.” Thus gaining a better understanding of the channels 
for contagion is a fruitful and timely line of inquiry. 
The concept of political contagion stressed in the paper has been largely 
ignored in the literature, if not in the statements of those individuals ultimately 
responsible for monetary and exchange rate policy decisions, as we 
are reminded in this paper. Political contagion revolves around the policy 
trade-off between the political losses incurred if policymakers decide to 
devalue and the economic gains achieved by doing so. The political losses 
arise primarily because policymakers wish to belong to a “club” that requires 
them to maintain the exchange rate peg as the fee for membership. 
The benefits from staying in the club are largely political and may accrue 
over the medium to long term. Contagion, in this context, arises if an 
“important” member of the club devalues, thereby reducing the resolve of   2
other club members to maintain the peg. This is referred to as “true” 
contagion and distinguished from “monsoonal effects,” which arise from 
economic transmission mechanisms. Importantly in this model, it is assumed 
that it is policymakers who decide which of the other club members 
influence their decision to devalue. Furthermore, devaluation is a political 
decision, not the inevitable outcome of the depletion of central bank reserves 
following bouts of speculative attacks. 
The trade-off between the economic gains of abandoning the peg and 
the credibility losses incurred in this model is common to “second generation” 
models of currency crises. For instance, the cost of maintaining the 
peg is rising unemployment or prohibitive debt-servicing costs (see Obstfeld 
1996). In any case, the policymakers’ decision to devalue improves 
the economic situation even if it ruins their credibility. 
I will group my remarks into three areas: the first pertains directly to 
the model outlined in this paper, the second is addressed to a broader 
family of second-generation balance-of-payments crisis models, and my 
final remarks apply to an even broader family of balance-of-payments crisis 
models that encompass first-generation, Krugman-type models. 
As regards the political contugion model, it is evident that this paper 
offers valuable insights in understanding a “peer pressure” mechanism 
that may play a key role in influencing whether a country devalues or not, 
especially in the context of a club, such as a currency union. The EMS 
during the ERM currency crises of 1992-93 stands out in this regard.   3
Besides introducing political considerations into the contagion process, 
the model is also useful in explaining why contagion may be regional 
rather than global. Perhaps this is an area that merits more attention and 
discussion in the paper. Specifically, the parameter 2, which summarizes 
the value to the country of being in the club, could be a weighted sum of 
the number of countries that satisfy the membership criteria, with weights 
depending on the importance for the home country of a given country’s 
participation. Hence, a member of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union may attach very little consequence to the collapse of a peg in faraway 
Thailand but a great deal of importance to a similar event in a neighboring 
country, one that is perceived to be an important member of the 
club. Though the empirical literature is scanty, the results in Calvo and 
Reinhart (1996) and Frankel and Schmukler (1996) suggest contagion 
tends to be regional rather than global. The evidence of contagion in Eichengreen, 
Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) may also point in that direction, as the 
bulk of their sample countries are in Europe. 
Having said this, I do not think this model (in its present form) helps 
us to understand contagious crises in emerging markets. Judging from the 
emphasis on the ERM crisis, perhaps this was intentional. First, there is 
the assumption that devaluation is a matter of political choice. This presumes, 
as acknowledged in the paper, that the central bank has access to 
ample lines of credit should it need it to support the currency. The central 
banks of most emerging markets have limited access, if any, to international   4
credit. At the time of devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 
1994, the stock of central bank reserves at hand could be best characterized 
as pocket change. The same can be said of the flotation of the Thai 
baht in July 1997, once the forward position of the central bank was taken 
into account. Devaluation was a necessity, not a choice. 
Second, the club is exclusively defined by the politicians. It is they who 
determine which countries weigh heavily in their resolve to maintain the 
peg and which do not. Yet many emerging countries do not get to choose 
which club they belong to. Korean politicians in 1997 thought they were 
joining the club known as the OECD; financial markets became convinced 
that Korea was a member of a different club, that of ailing tigers. Argentina’s currency 
board came under severe attack and Brazil’s real less so following 
the peso’s slide, not because these countries shared an explicit or 
implicit currency arrangement with Mexico, but because international financial 
markets decided they belonged to the failed exchange-rate-based 
inflation stabilization club. Thus is may be a fruitful exercise in the context 
of this model to explore the possible endogeneity of 2, which may be time 
varying and depend on both the types of shocks the economy is subjected 
to and the market’s assessment of the probability of devaluation. 
Third, it is assumed, and this applies to other models that stress conflicting 
policy objectives, that the political and credibility losses of abandoning 
the peg are compensated by the economic gains from doing so. 
Central to this argument is the premise that devaluations are expansionary.   5
Indeed, rumor has it that Nigel Lawson was happily singing in the 
shower hours after the devaluation of the pound during the ERM crisis. I 
would argue that a better characterization of the emerging market dilemma 
is as follows: If the country does not devalue and maintains tight 
monetary and fiscal policies to defend the peg, it has a recession-witness 
Argentina’s 5.8 percent decline in GDP in 1995. If, on the other hand, the 
central bank caves in and devalues, the country also has a recessionrecall 
Mexico’s 6.2 percent decline in GDP during 1995 and Indonesia’s 
13.7 percent collapse of GDP in 1998. The bulk of the empirical evidence 
suggests that devaluations are contractionary in developing countries (see, 
e.g., Edwards 1989)-so much for relieving pressures on the unemployment 
rate. Furthermore, devaluation does not help relieve debt-servicing 
burdens through the mechanism of lower interest rates, as in industrial 
countries, which primarily have domestic currency debt. Foreign currency 
debt weighs heavily in both public and private sectors in most developing 
countries. 
Hence, I would argue that models (such as this one) that focus on conflicting 
objectives provide insights into the crisis and, in this case, contagion 
process in industrial countries but are less helpful in understanding 
currency crises in emerging markets, which are usually followed by output 
collapses. In recent months, for instance, growth forecasts for the infected 
Asian countries have been continuously marked down, highlighting that 
their experience does not differ from others in this regard. Calvo’s timeto-   6
build model, for instance, suggests outcomes that are more in line with 
the stylized facts just described (see chap. 3 in this volume). 
Last, to understand the causes and timing of crises and mechanisms of 
contagion, it may be necessary to rethink some of the assumptions embedded 
in both first- and second-generation models. Central to these models 
is the shared feature of the rational forward-looking speculator. Yet the 
empirical evidence is far from conclusive in providing support for the view 
that markets are forward looking. In our work we found that interest rates 
and domestic-foreign interest rate differentials had no valuable predictive 
power, either in absolute terms or relative to other indicators, when it came 
to anticipating currency crises (see Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999). Goldfajn 
and Valdes (2000) reach a similar conclusion when analyzing the 
predictive ability of currency forecasts culled from the Financial Times 
surveys. Rating agencies do just as badly (see Goldstein, Kaminsky, and 
Reinhart 2000). The widespread use of mechanical backward-looking filter 
rules for trading decisions in financial markets also suggests that not 
all speculators know or care about economic or political fundamentals. 
Perhaps it is time to incorporate some of these features when we attempt 
to model “true” contagion, which I would define differently than in the 
paper, since I would suggest that medium- to longer-term political goals 
are also part of the broader set of “fundamentals” and the spirit of “true” 
contagion is to be found in herding behavior or animal spirits.   7
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